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ABSTRACT: What is trust? How does it function as a primary virtue for persuasive arguments? How
does its presumption contribute to the effectiveness of an argument’s persuasiveness? This
presentation will explore these questions and the controversy among scholars regarding how trust is
generated and under what conditions it is lost. We will also discuss whether inauthentic
trustworthiness is a manipulation used for gaining a fallacious advantage in argumentation.
KEYWORDS: distrust, interpersonal trust, trust, trustworthiness

1. INTRODUCTION
What is trust? Researchers have yet to arrive at a consensus as to whether trust is
an emotion, a behavior, a rationale decision, a ‘leap of faith’, a neurobiological
expression or some combination of all of the above. Currently, we know more about
what trust does than what trust is (Castaldo, Premazzi, & Zerbini, 2010, p. 657). We
do know that it is a human phenomenon that plays a critical role in our personal
lives (Govier, 1998; Hardin, 2006), in the fabric of society (Govier, 1997; Rothstein,
2005), in the stability of financial markets (Audi, 2008) and the strength of
governments (Fukyama, 1995). People with higher levels of trust are happier
(Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008), healthier (Gilson, 2003), and live longer
(Barefoot, et al., 1998). Children who fail to develop trust are more likely to engage
in criminal behavior, substance abuse and self-harm, including suicide (Langille,
Asbridge, Kisely, & Rasic, 2012). When people lose trust in legal and judicial
institutions they are less likely to be compliant with laws and regulations (Tyler,
1994). When citizens lose trust in political leaders and government structures, civil
unrest and the deterioration of the social fabric can occur (Sullivan & Transue,
1999). The loss of trust between global financial institutions can contribute to
events such as the recent fiscal crises that we see across industrial countries (Earle,
2009). When governments lose trust in each other, the world can become very
insecure (Rothstein, 2005), evidenced by events such as the cold war, the gulf wars,
the stand-off between North and South Korea, Israel and Syria, and so on. Thus trust,
a concept in which we know very little about, can have devastating consequences
when it is broken, betrayed, lost or absent (Currall & Epstein, 2003). In fact, one
author has noted that we need trust “in order to live at all” (Hosking, 2006, p. 95).
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Perhaps one of the reasons that we still have little consensus on the nature of
trust is that each discipline has focused on the role of trust exclusively as it functions
within their field of study (Rodgers, 2009). The recent explosion of interest in trust
has resulted in a range of definitions and discussions regarding the nature of the
construct, but mainly within discipline boundaries. For example, a systematic
review on the role of trust in business management identified 96 different
definitions of trust across 50 years of research (Castaldo et al., 2010, p. 659).
Moreover, based on the heterogeneity and complexity of their findings, they raise
concerns about the use of a few simple definitions for a very complex topic (Castaldo
et al., 2010, p. 662).
2. TRUST DOMAINS
For the past seven years I have been conducting a systematic review of the literature
on trust, distrust and trustworthiness across disciplines. To organize this research, I
have created the following five domain classifications--interpersonal, social,
institutional, political and meta trust. Here is a quick summary of the types of
discussions that are organized into each of these domains as an illustration of the
breadth of interest in trust.
In the interpersonal trust domain, research focuses on trust between
individuals whether in familial or close relationships, among friends, acquaintances,
between strangers, as well as within the types of interactions between individuals
where trust is a necessary condition (as opposed to confidence, reliance, or
familiarity—distinctions that I summarize in later parts of this paper). Most of the
current research on trust can be found within this domain, which will also be the
primary focus of my presentation today as it corresponds most closely to issues
relevant to argumentation.
The next domain is social trust which includes trust between individuals and
groups or within and across groups. Here is where I locate discussions of social
capital, such as discussions of trust within bridging and bonding social capital—
Coleman (1990) and Putnam (2000)—as well as empowerment social capital as
described by Stanton-Salazar (2011). This is also where discussions regarding the
influence of discrimination and stigmatization have on trust (Rothstein, 2005), and
where I have placed Dr. Govier’s discussion of rhetorical disadvantage (Govier,
1993) as well as her discussion on trust in social communities (Govier, 1997).
The next domain is institutional trust which includes trust between
individuals and professionals, such as patient-physician trust (Hupcey, Penrod,
Morse & Mitcham, 2001), organizations such as the health care system (Gilson,
2003; Mechanic, 1998), child welfare system (Bessant, Hil, & Watts, 2005),
businesses and financial institutions (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). Research on the
role of institutional trust in business, organizational management, financial markets,
and on-line systems has been one of the fastest growing areas and is also one of the
few places where the impact of distrust has been most fully explored (Schoorman,
Mayer, & Davis, 2007).
The next domain is political trust where I organize research on trust between
individuals and systems of governance, within and between governments and
2
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government agencies such as trust in the police, legislatures/parliaments and
judicial systems (Kramer & Cook, 2004). In this domain, research on trust explores
how it manifests itself between citizens and political systems, including politicians
and governmental agents such as regulatory bodies (McDermott, 2012). Discussions
in this domain also explore how trust influences the relationships both within and
between governments (Audi, 2008; Fukyama, 1995). In this domain, I also include
the role of trust promoting civil democracy as the foundation for the ‘common good’
or ‘common weal’ and the space where discussions of the public good and social
welfare contributes to the advancement of society (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan,
Swindler, Tipton, 1985; Hauser & Benoit-Barne, 2002). Within this domain, the
connection between trust and argumentation research can make a substantial
contribution to the discussion of contributive democracy and the process by which
‘good arguments’ are made and delivered to contribute to civil society (Newton,
2001).
The last domain I call meta-trust which includes research on the
biochemistry of trust, such as the use of oxytocin to increase trust (Kosfeld,
Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005), the location of trust and distrust in the
brain using fMRI studies (Dimoka, 2010), and trust as a human phenomenon that
transcends the confinement of definition (Buford, 2009). I think this area is also
relevant to argumentation theory as discussions in this domain include the
individual propensity for trust and ways that trust may be able to be manipulated to
gain advantage. An excellent paper explores the possibility that these new areas of
trust research may represent potentially fallacious arguments (Gibbons, 2007).
Regarding my presentation today, I will focus on research within two of these
domains and summarize selected findings as they may contribute to argumentation
theory—interpersonal trust and meta-trust. First let me begin with an overview of
my particular approach to the dynamics of trust, distrust and trustworthiness as a
context for my later discussions on the role of trust in argumentation within the
interpersonal and meta-trust domains.
3. TRUST, DISTRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS FRAMEWORK
Based on the systematic review that I have been conducting, I illustrate the
dynamics between trust, distrust and trustworthiness into a framework I call my
‘trust triangle’ (See Figure 1, below). Embedded within this framework are three
sets of assumptions, which are also relevant to argumentation discussions:
assumption 1) each of the three constructs within the trust relationship—trust,
distrust and trustworthiness—embodies characteristics that are unique and
independent of the trust relationship or interaction, i.e. that these constructs can be
examined in their own fundamental nature and are not dependent upon a
relationship for their manifestation; assumption 2) there is a relational dynamic
between trust and trustworthiness and distrust and trustworthiness that will
influence the expression of these constructs within a relationship; assumption 3)
that distrust is a distinct construct that is separate from trust (not the opposite of)
and has different characteristics from that of trust as well as a different relational
dynamic with trustworthiness. These assumptions are expressed within each of the
3
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three components of the trust triangle: trust, distrust and trustworthiness. I will
examine how they manifest in two domains—interpersonal trust and meta-trust in
this presentation.
H=High L=Low

Trustworthiness
L

H

Trust

H

L

L

H

Distrust

Figure 1: Trust Triangle
3.1 Trust
Let’s begin with the perspective of the person or entity engaging in trust—the
trustor. Since the 1960s, the majority of trust research has focused on the individual,
group, etc who is doing the ‘trusting’ and how and when the decision to trust occurs
from this perspective. Historically, discussions of trust have not always focused on
the person doing the trusting, but the characteristics of the person or object being
trusted, e.g. ‘trustworthiness’. For example, some of the earliest writings on the
characteristics of trustworthy individuals and institutions can be found in Aristotle’s
‘Ethos’ and in his virtue ethics discussions. In these writings, the focus is on the
behaviors, characteristics and principles that we should observe or expect from
someone or an object that is to be considered as ‘trustworthy’. However, after much
of these early writings on trustworthiness, trust moved into the background and
was considered as an ancillary construct in discussions on relationships.
Trust emerged again as a construct of interest in the 1960s when
psychologists identified trust as an indicator of healthy child development and
stable adult relationships (Rotter, 1971). A psychologist and social learning theorist
developed and tested the first empirically validated scale to measure interpersonal
trust focusing on attributes of affective-based trust (Rotter, 1967). With this reemergence of trust as a construct worth independent exploration, the focus shifted
from the target of trust—and the assessment of their trustworthiness—to the
trustor and their propensity or personality attributes conducive to being a ‘trusting
person’ as evidence of a healthy personality. As a result, the majority of trust
research and discussion focuses on how trust is gained and sustained rather than on
4
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what it means to be trustworthy and the responsibilities placed upon the object of
trust. Several researchers have recently argued that discussions of trust have been
dominated by an optimistic bias that trust is always a “positive virtue” (Gargiulo &
Ertug, 2006, p. 165) and a “catch-all panacea” for solving interpersonal and
institutional problems (McAllister, 1997). This has lead to a number of very recent
discussions on the ‘dark side of trust’ and the potential negative role that trust might
play in relationships for both the trustor and the object of trust (Skinner, Dietz, &
Weibel, 2013).
Within the interpersonal trust domain, a commonly cited definition is “a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt
& Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Three elements in the ‘trustor’s’ perspective are
important here: 1) the willingness to take a risk or be vulnerable; 2) in the face of
uncertainty or uncertain outcome; 3) regarding the positive expectations of another.
The characteristic that differentiates trust from other elements of relationships—
such as confidence, reliance, belief, etc—is the willingness to take a risk or be
vulnerable to another. This risk has been described in various ways such as a ‘leap
of faith’ (Möllering, 2006) or a ‘suspension of disbelief’ (Holton, 1994) on the part of
the trustor toward the person or object of their trust and has a long legacy in trust
discussions (Möllering, 2001). The inherent risk component of trust differentiates it
from confidence and reliability; we can develop an expectation of future fulfillment
of an agreement or confidence in the actions of another without also incurring
vulnerability. When we must make a ‘leap of faith’ to assume a specific outcome, we
have incurred trust. The risk or vulnerability characteristic of trust can also be seen
when our expectations are not met: when someone has betrayed our confidence or
found to be unreliable, our typical response is to be disappointed (Luhmann, 2000).
However, when our trust is betrayed, we feel a greater emotional sense of violation,
based upon the risk and vulnerability that we assumed in the trust relationship. Not
only do we feel betrayed, but we also feel regret that we trusted in the first place, or
even at all (Luhman, 2000). Inherent in our response to trust violations is both an
external sense of betrayal by the other, but also an internal betrayal by our own
senses. As a result, once trust is lost, we may never regain it—or may only regain it
with great time or effort (Lewicki, 2006). On the other hand, when we are
disappointed in someone, we may be able to rebuild our confidence based upon
future interactions, or their demonstrated reliability, but violated trust requires a
reparation in both the external relationship and the internal experience (Luhman,
2000). As a result, there has been quite a bit of concern among trust researchers
that trust is being conflated with concepts such as confidence and reliability, which
diminishes the greater consequences of trust betrayal and regret (Baier, 1986;
Brownlie, 2008; Luhman, 2000).
One of the current trends within research on interpersonal trust is to classify
different types or forms of trust. Three of the most common classifications are
affective-based trust, cognitive-based trust and morality-based trust (Lahno, 2001;
McAllister, 1995; Olekalns & Smith, 2009). Affective-based trust is emotionally based
(Lahno, 2001) and focuses on the positive expectations by the trustor that their
object of trust will act in their best interests, will act benevolently toward them, that
5
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they will not act in any way that would bring harm to the trustor (Möllering, 2008).
Cognitive-based trust is rationality-based (Hardin, 2002, 2006) and focuses on the
positive assessment by the trustor that the object of trust will be competent, have
integrity as well as be transparent and consistent in their actions (Hupcey, et al.,
2001). Morality-based trust can be either emotional or rational and focuses on the
positive assessment or experience by the trustor that their object of trust shares
their moral standards, principals and ethics (Lahno, 2001; Siegrist, Earle & Gutscher,
2007).
Interpersonal trust can range from high to low, involve very small to very
large risks, emerge instantaneously through a first impression, or be gained over a
long period of time through the course of a relationship or series of interactions. We
may be consciously aware of our trust as in cognitive-based trust or we may not be
aware of entering into a trusting relationship as is more common in affective-based
trust. Different forms of trust may also be more common in certain types of
relationships, such as with a professional or skilled tradesman (trust you might have
with your doctor or for your plumber versus your spouse) based upon the
characteristics of the relationship or the trustworthy characteristics of person or
object of trust.
3.2 Trustworthiness
The second element in my trust triangle are the characteristics of the person or
object of trust—their ‘trustworthiness’—these are qualities or expressions by the
‘trustee’ or ‘trusted object’. This object of trust does not need to be another person,
it can also be a organization, institution, etc. (Brownlie, 2008; Gilson, 2003). As
mentioned earlier, original discussions on trust focused on the characteristics of
trustworthiness and what behaviors or attributes could be considered ‘trustworthy’
and would warrant the placement of trust. Characteristics of trustworthiness can
include behaviors such as authentic or accurate portrayals or claims of expertise,
competence, honesty, integrity, transparency and consistency (Rodgers, 2009). They
can also include intention to be trustworthy—such as the intent to act in good faith,
to act compassionately, or with benevolence (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995;
McKnight & Chervany, 2002).
Hardin’s book on Trust and Trustworthiness (2002) is excellent, however,
there are few other current discussions on the role of trustworthiness outside of the
organizational context (Elsbach, 2004) and emerging discussions within the
professional ethics context reviving Aristotle’s discussion of virtue ethics (Lovat &
Gray, 2008). Some discussion on trustworthiness of data and methods can been seen
within the constructivist epistemological paradigm as a consideration for assessing
the rigor of a qualitative research study (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004) and within
the journalism profession regarding the role of the undercover journalist in
investigative reporting (Wasik, 2008). However, little of this discussion focuses on
the relational aspects of trustworthiness and the emerging definitions of trust. In
other words, what are the characteristics of trustworthiness, which warrant the risk
or vulnerability of the trustor? Current discussions of trust have not explored
questions of trustworthiness in alignment with the discussions of the behavior of
6
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the trustor. We don’t teach our professionals to think in terms of how can I be a
trustworthy professional? Our government officials aren’t asking the question, how
do I act in a trustworthy way, or how do we build societal structures that are
trustworthy?. Instead discussions continue to focus on how do I gain the trust of a
client, of a constituent, of a voter or a consumer—which I think is the wrong
question. So I think there is much work to be done in this area in which
argumentation theorists could contribute.
3.3 Distrust
Distrust is the third element in this three part triangle as a small body of research
has identified distrust as a distinct construct which has differential attributes as well
as a distinct influence on the context of relationships from that of trust (Lewicki,
McAllister and Bies, 1998). Early research on trust assumed that distrust was
merely the opposite end of the continuum of trust and that a relationship could
move back and forth on a continuum of trust/distrust or suspicion (Deutsch, 1958).
Both trust and distrust still embody the defining characteristics of vulnerability and
risk, but there are separate expectations in the face of an uncertainty—in the trust
continuum the ‘trustor’ takes an optimistic expectation of a positive outcome while
in the distrust continuum, the ‘trustor’ expects to experience harm and injurious
behavior along with negative self-interest from the object of their distrust (Cho,
2006). These different etiological points change both the behavior of the trustor and
his or her interpretation of the intentions and behavior of the person or object of
trust—or distrust—which in turn critically alters the dynamics of the relationship
(Nickel, 2007; Rodgers, 2009).
The fragility of trust and the movement into distrust is also a concern; it is
possible that once trust has been betrayed, or a previous trustor has shifted onto the
distrust continuum, return to a trusting relationship may not be possible; any
ensuing interaction will only result in lower or higher levels of distrust (Lewicki,
2006; Simons, 2002). The consequences of this critical dynamic can be observed in
interactions between individuals, groups and institutions, and legal and
governmental entities. Once trust is lost, further disintegration within the
relationship, social structures and political systems continues until a final
dissolution occurs, which can result in relationship terminating, organizational and
institutional upheavals changes and political revolutions (Grönlund & Setälä, 2012;
Hauser & Benoit-Barne, 2002).
A second reason to explore trust and distrust as separate constructs is that
researchers have found that within interpersonal trust, we can trust and distrust
someone simultaneously, combining trust with low levels of distrust (Hardin, 2006).
In the cognitive trust context, we trust those with specific expertise, such as
professionals, to competently carry out one set of tasks, but not necessarily trust
them to carry out other tasks for which they are not trained (Siegrist, Gutscher &
Earle, 2005). For example, you might trust your family physician to make an
accurate diagnose of your illness, but you wouldn’t trust them to conduct surgery,
you would expect to see specialist, to carry out that task. You might call in a plumber
if you have a leaky faucet, but you would not trust them to cut your hair while they
7
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are there. You might trust a colleague to write a paper with you, but not trust them
to manage a sensitive departmental issue, or show up to a meeting on time. In the
affective trust context, I may trust someone to housesit and not steal from me while
I am on vacation, but I may not trust them to keep a secret or to care for my wellbeing (Govier, 1998).
4. MUTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS
4.1 Argumentation contributions to trust theory
Dr. Govier’s work is an example of the important work that argmentation theorists
can contribute to trust research (1993, 1997, 1998). Moreover, argumentation
theory is one of the few places where the scholarly dialogue could further the
understanding and assessment of trustworthiness. As the origination of an
argument and the locus of persuasion originates with the ‘trustworthy’ entry point
into the trust dialogue, the characteristics of the person putting forward the
argument and the relational dynamic in the direction of trustworthiness to the
‘trustor’ has much to add to the current dialogue on trust.
In particular, questions on when violations of trust, or the expression of false
trustworthiness, in order to persuade or manipulate a situation, become a key
consideration in evaluating arguments. For example, a discussion on undercover
journalism was recently repeated on National Public Radio which discussed the role
of undercover journalism, especially in wake of difficult situations where trust is
manipulated for the purpose of gathering information or research data. When the
true situation is exposed, it will almost inevitably result in the betrayal and violation
of trust. In this radio segment, a discussion of how an undercover journalist decides
how and when to disclose their deception and face the inevitable loss of trust was
discussed (Gladstone, 2013). An undercover journalist describes his decision to
leave the job that he had taken in a meatpacking factory just prior to being
discovered as a journalist and, therefore, revealed as deceptive to his friends and coworkers at the factory. He describes his angst at inevitably betraying their trust, and
exposing himself as untrustworthy, as his decision to leave (Wasik, 2008). In
assessing his qualities as an undercover journalist and the related ethical dilemmas,
a colleague described him as having the “right amount of agony” over the process of
deception in order to persuade his colleagues of his trustworthiness, and the
potential loss of trust as a result of his exposure. It was his angst in reflecting on his
lack of trustworthiness, and the potential impact on the trust of his colleagues that
made his deception ‘acceptable.’ (Gladstone, 2013).
Another consideration within the current dialogue in trust and distrust is the
concept of ‘agency’, and whether or not the the ‘trustor’ has the autonomy to
willingly accept the vulnerability and risk inherent in entering into a trusting
relationship. For example, does ‘encapsulated self-interest’ as described by Hardin,
drive the manifestation of trust in the rational trust model (Hardin, 2002). If so, then
interactions that would reduce the agency of the trustor to enter into a trusting
relationship, such as power or manipulation, would constitute a violation of trust
and potentially alter the interaction into one of distrust, with potentially more lost
8
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than gained. On the other hand, many argue that we make decisions to trust more
frequently based upon incomplete information and make ‘leaps of faith’ to engage in
a trust relationship, in which case, we may introduce a moral responsibility on the
person making the argument to protect the vulnerability, or the well-being, of the
person within the interaction.
Similarly, attitudes of discrimination and stigma can influence the trust
relationship, both within the specific construct of distrust—as a dimension within
the construct of the ‘distrustor’—as well as within the dynamic between distrust
and trustworthiness. Here is where Dr. Govier’s discussions on rhetorical
disadvantage may be relevant to research on distrust, where some groups, based on
their character or attributes, are considered more trustworthy, while others are
‘disadvantaged’ in situations where their voices are necessary, yet their arguments
are considered inherently unpersuasive because they have characteristics which
make them assessed as untrustworthy, such as gender, race/ethnicity or societal
position such as socio-economic status, group affiliation and so on.
4.2 Trust research contributions to the study of argumentation
For purposes of applying trust research to discussions in argumentation, I am going
to cover just a couple studies from the fields of negotiation and organizational
management whose results may be most interesting to argumentation theorists.
Within the field of negotiation, the development and use of interpersonal trust has
been associated with positive outcomes and greater joint gains among the parties.
Even though it would seem logical that negotiators would engage in rational-based
strategies, negotiators often listened to their internal affective experience and acted
upon feelings of interpersonal trust. The findings from a large study of the role of
trust in negotiation found that as negotiators experienced more trust from their
constituents, they acted with greater flexibility and exhibited less defensive
strategies (Turner, 1990, p. 61). However, when negotiators experienced less trust
from constituents, they engaged more ‘disruptive’ behaviors and adopted a more
‘win-lose’ strategy which resulted in fewer mutual benefits (Turner, 1990, p. 61).
However, the results from this study have been contradicted by another,
which specifically explored the use of power and deception to gain advantage in
negotiations and how trust might influence behavior in these situations (Olekalns &
Smith, 2009). When all other issues within the context were equal, negotiators
would preference their own affective states when deciding to deceive or set up a
situation where they would take advantage. Negotiators used deception when they
thought the other party would exploit them and if they were distrustful of the other
party. Negotiators who felt anxious were also more likely to deceive as they paid
more attention to their affective states and the role of interpersonal trust, than the
actual context, (Olekalns & Smith, 2009, p. 360).
However, the most surprising results came from the situation where the
constituents showed high level of affective trust for the negotiator. In this situation,
the negotiators employed deception, even when the stakes were low and when
there was little to gain (Olekalns & Smith, 2009, p. 359). The authors concluded that
when the negotiators detected that affective trust was high, the negotiator would
9
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take advantage of this situation and use their trust to the negotiator’s advantage,
even when the gains were small. Negotiators felt they had “greater latitude” in their
behavior and that they would be more likely to be “forgiven” by “nice” opponents
and “seized the opportunity” to improve their outcomes or increase their gains
through deception (Olekalns & Smith, 2009, p. 359).
Finally, there is a broad area of research on how people decide to trust and
how trust influences their behavior when engaging in financial transactions. These
studies use an exchange process outlined in a commonly used ‘trust game’ that
manipulate situations where two individuals exchange money based on rules which
allow for the examination of trust and trustworthy behavior. This ‘trust game’ has
been played with varying levels of sophistication and complicated interactions
(Burnham, McCabe, Smith, 2000). However, in one study, individuals engaged in this
‘trust game’ where they are unable to see each other and were interviewed as to
their ‘strategy’ for playing the game (Hotz, 2005; King-Casas, et al., 2005). In one
interview, two women were participants in a study where they were playing on-line
across two universities in separate parts of the US (Hotz, 2005). One of the
participants, in the role of the ‘trustor’ described how their strategy involved
trusting the other person to do the right thing and intended to follow-through all the
way to the end. The second person, the one in the ‘trustworthy’ position, articulated
that they intended to act in a trustworthy way all the way to the end, and then in the
final play, they would betray the other person and take all the money. The article
describes each of the turns of play as each described their strategy (Hotz, 2005). In
the end, the person in the ‘trustworthy’ position did not betray the other person,
and her behavior surprised even herself, as she could not really say why she had
acted in a trustworthy way.
This leads us to explore elements of the propensity to trust or be
trustworthy, as described by research in what I have labeled, ‘meta’-trust.
5. META-TRUST
Meta-trust includes explorations of the etiology of trust that is specific to the
physical, chemical or emotional contributions to the nature of ‘trusting’ or being a
‘trusting’ or ‘trustful’ person. In this domain, I will cover these trust antecedents,
such as biochemical trust and the neurobiology of trust.
Within biochemistry, a hormone has been identified as having an influence
on trust called oxytocin (Kosfeld, et al., 2005; Nowakowski, Vaillancourt, & Schmidt,
2010). Studies of these chemicals have found that when experimental subjects were
administered these hormones, they exhibited increased trust. In these experiments
trust was defined as exhibiting greater willingness to take risks in exchange
situations where they had the potential to be exploited (Kosfeld, et al., 2005). In
studies of the influence of oxytocin on behavior, participants who were
administered the hormone showed an increase in positive emotional feelings, which
in turn lowered their inhibitions for taking risks. However, they did not engage in
just any form of risk-taking, but only “social risks in relation to interpersonal
interactions” (Kosfeld, et al., 2005, p. 673). Since risk-taking is a component of trust,
the behaviors that exhibit the evidence of trust appear to be increased, as well as the
10
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positive expectations that accompany the affective forms of trust. The hormones
that accompany these changes in emotions are related to the same types of
hormones that are activated with dopamine (Hotz, 2005). Quite literally, it feels
good to experience ‘trust’.
In neurobiology, researchers are working to find the area of the brain where
trust resides. A new field called ‘neuro-economics’ is exploring the biological
contributions to economic behavior including the physical role of trust. In the
largest brain-imaging study on economics in the US, researchers at Baylor
University explore the brain responses to decision-making when engaging in
financial decision making (King-Casas, et al., 2005). As players interact, their brain
activity is monitored to identify changes based on their decision-making patterns
and levels of trust. In these studies, as well as others that examine brain imaging and
trust, researchers have identified specific areas of the brain that activate when
individuals are experience trust and distrust as well as assessments of
trustworthiness (Boudreau, McCubbins & Coulson, 2009; Dimoka, 2010; Krueger, et
al., 2007).
Similar to conceptual discussions that identify different behaviors associated
with trust and distrust, neurobiology shows there are different areas of the brain
associated with these two constructs as well. Trust activated areas of the brain
connected with reward and predictability, while distrust was more closely
associated with emotion and fear of loss (Dimoka, 2010, p. 16). In two separate
studies, researchers compared the brain activity of older and younger individuals
and found that the assessment of facial distinctions associated with trustworthy or
untrustworthy cues decreased with age (Castle, et al., 2012). The authors concluded
that this decreased brain activity related to the assessment of facial cues contributed
to the vulnerability of elderly individuals to fraud and abuse (Castle, et al., 2012).
Similar risks might also be associated with individuals that have a natural
propensity for decreased activity in this brain area, and might also make them more
vulnerable to deception and manipulation.
From an argumentation perspective, science discussions in the popular
press—not necessarily the scholarly articles—may constitute fallacious arguments
(Gibbons, 2007). Gibbons indicates that informal science descriptions of complex
processes do not provide sufficient technical details that allow the reader to assess
the credibility of the argument. Furthermore, the way in which the argument is
“framed” reduces the participation of the reader in the critical thinking necessary to
conduct a thorough assessment of the grounds for the argument or an evaluation of
the implications (Gibbons, 2007, p. 185). Therefore, this type of popular argument
does not meet the standards of a ‘good argument’ and may do more harm than good
in educating the public.
It is exactly this type of analysis and critique that argumentation theorists
can contribute to a vastly expanding dialogue on the use and misuses of trust. You
can remind of us of the need to focus on the responsibility and consequences of
trustworthy behavior within the trust dynamic and how to identify when we are
heading down erroneous paths. Help us to explore the question of when we ask
someone to engage in trust with us—to ‘trust us’—what are we really asking them
to do? And what are our responsibilities when we take on the role of the object of
11

SUZANNE MCMURPHY
trust—for example as the argumentor—in the expectation of risk and vulnerability
that we ask the ‘trustor’ to engage in?
6. CONCLUSION
So I leave you with a series of questions regarding the implications of current trust
research for the study of argumentation.
6.1 Question 1
How much does the existence and level of trust or distrust in a relationship
influence the context and process of an argument? If trust is manipulated to gain an
advantage in an argument, could this be considered a fallacious argument? Or do all
arguments rely on the manipulation of trust—i.e. that asking someone to trust us
always requires that person to take a ‘leap of faith’ or ‘risk’ to trust us? Is this an
inherent mechanism for persuasion, either consciously or unconsciously?
6.2 Question 2
Do we need to trust the individual who puts forth an argument, or can we separate
the content of the argument from the person putting forth the argument, such that
the person making the argument does not need to be ‘trustworthy’ but only that the
content meet standard expectations of arguments?
6.3 Question 3
Should the preservation of trust, or the avoidance of the creation of distrust, be
included as a goal of argumentation or within the assessment of a ‘good’ argument?
6.4 Question 4
Given that trust is based upon risk-taking in the face of uncertainty, do we need to
evaluate arguments based upon their potential harm, or impact on the wellbeing of
the trustor or the person to whom the argument is being made? Does self-respect
and autonomy become important elements? If an argument requires that the
‘trustor’ give up elements of their autonomy or agency in order to engage in the
dialogue, what is the responsibility of the person putting forth the argument for
assuring that they consider their influence and ‘power’ over the person they are
engaging in a trust relationship? Situations of high trust may result in the
acceptance of arguments without sufficient dialogue or critique, for example.
6.5 Question 5
Is trust always an element in arguments or can arguments be made where the risk
and vulnerability are sufficiently low that trust is not an element?
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6.6 Question 6
If part of the role of the ‘arguer’ is to engage their audience in such a way as to gain
their trust (Tindale, 2004), what is being requested of those in the ‘trustor’ position?
Should more discussion focus on the types of trust that one should engage in (i.e.
competence and integrity) and perhaps types of trust that one should not engage in
(benevolence or ‘best interests’) so that there is less risk of betrayal?
6.7 Question 7
If factors in the production of trust can be reduced to individual characteristics of
physical chemistry, if you can purchase a nasal spray with oxytocin, how might this
influence the role and responsibility of the person in the argument?
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